主 题：Are the Only-Child Discriminated in China’s Labor Market? Evidence from a Field Experiment
摘 要： China’s 35-year implementation of the one-child policy has generated more than 150 million only child, and they have become an increasingly important source of labor force in the market. By sending fictitious resumes to online job postings in various industries and job categories in the largest Chinese city Shanghai, we investigate how being an only child with different gender affects an applicant’s probability of receiving a job interview. Specifically, we manipulate the combination of applicant’s gender and only child identity in the resumes and guarantee other characteristics such as education background and working experience statistically identical. Our results show that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview is significantly lower for the only child than for the sibling ones, and this is robust across various industries, job categories as well as firm size and ownership.
关于主讲人：何浩然，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院副教授，瑞典哥德堡大学经济学博士。主要研究方向为实验经济学、行为经济学、劳动经济学、环境经济学。何浩然近年来在Experimental Economics、Economics Letters、Environment and Development Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Environment and Planning A、Journal of Forest Economics、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外期刊发表论文多篇。