吴一平，经济学博士，上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院教授、博士生导师，研究领域涉及经济学、金融学和政治学，具体包括经济政策与企业行为、政府治理与经济发展、政治网络的价值等。已经在国内外重要期刊发表论文数十篇，包括Governance、World Development、Journal of Happiness Studies、China Economic Review、经济研究、管理世界、经济学季刊和世界经济等。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、国家社会科学基金重大项目子课题、上海市人民政府课题等数十项。担任American Political Science Review、China Economic Review、Journal of Business Ethics、Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice、经济研究、社会学研究、经济学季刊、中国工业经济、金融研究、财贸经济等国内外期刊审稿专家。
Natural disaster can be a lens to reflect the state’s governance. Taking the Wenchuan Earthquake as an example, this paper investigates how natural disaster and its accompanied inter government transfer payment affect the misuse of public funds by local governments. We argue that major natural disasters, such as earthquakes, will bring more transfer payments to the local, but not necessarily increase misuses of these funds, mainly due to the promotion incentives of local officials and the strengthening of supervision by the upper government. Using DID method, our empirical analyses reveal that after the Wenchuan earthquake, compared to less impacted counties, more special transfer payments have been delivered to the hugely impacted counties, and less misuse of public funds are found in these counties, which is mainly reflected in the places where the central audit office is stationed. Further, we find that the promotion incentives and political networks of county Party Secretaries help to explain this mechanism; after the earthquake, local officials with less misuse are more likely to be promoted.