【12月27日】【中央财经大学经济学院“龙马经济学双周学术论坛”】2017年秋季学期第八讲·Class Identity and Dynamics of Elite Recruitment in Ru发布日期：2019-09-12 21:12:32
题 目：Class Identity and Dynamics of Elite Recruitment in Rural China
黄英伟，管理学博士，中国社科院经济所副研究员、《中国经济史研究》编辑。主要研究方向是经济史、经济发展和农村人民公社。在China Agricultural Economic Review、《经济学（季刊）》、《中国经济史研究》、《中国农村经济》等杂志发表多篇论文。曾出版《工分制下的农户劳动》（2011）等，《二 十世纪七十年代农户收入》（即将出版）。
The dynamics of elite recruitment are important to understand the governance and politics of a state. In this paper, we study how the imposed class identity affects one’s and the second generations’ political statuses in a transition economy. During the land-reform campaigns around 1950s in China, “class” labels were artificially imposed on rural residents according to criterion such as the size of land owned and the number of peasants one hired. Based on micro-level datasets, we show that such a class label plays a crucial role in determining residents’ and their next generations’ chance to join the CCP in rural China. The rural residents affixed as “bad class” (rich peasants and landlords) had a smaller chance to join the party. Such a pattern also spreads to their next generation. However, the adverse effect of class label gets significantly reduced or even reversed along the initialization of the market oriented reform. The reversion of class-label effect is weaker in the north area, where the initial political campaigns during land reform were far more radical. These patterns reflect the functional transformation of the governing party in a developing regime from a revolutionary organization, and that the dynamics of elite recruitment is path dependent.