【6月5日】Government Procurement, Market Power, andConsumer Welfare- Empirical Evidence from theInfant F发布日期：2019-09-12 21:11:06
一、主题：Government Procurement, Market Power, andConsumer Welfare: Empirical Evidence from theInfant Formula Market
二、主讲人：安永红，德州农工大学经济系助理教授（with tenure）。他在约翰霍普金斯大学获得经济学博士学位，研究领域包括微观计量和产业组织，曾在Journal of Econometrics、Journal of Business & Economic Statistics、Journal ofApplied Econometrics、Applied Economics等期刊发表多篇学术论文。
Abstract: The US infant formula market is highly concentrated and over one-half of thetotal sales are sold through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program forWomen,Infants, and Children (WIC). The three major manufacturers compete not only fornon-WIC consumers but also to serve WIC participants exclusively by bidding arebate on their wholesale prices. Using data of sales and manufacturers' rebates, weinvestigate how the WIC program (1) affects manufacturers' pricing strategies andleads to the substantial gap between the wholesale prices and the after-rebate prices,and (2) distorts the prices paid by the non-WIC consumers. Our estimates showthat manufacturers' marginal costs are much higher than the prices paid by WICprogram. Nevertheless, winning a WIC contract is profitable because serving WICparticipants has a substantial spillover effect (increasing 30.6% of the demand fromnonparticipants), and the manufacturer's loss from WIC participants are subsidizedby the increased prices for nonparticipants. We further conduct counterfactualanalyses to investigate the impacts of the WIC program on non-WIC consumers.