讲座题目：Institutional Ownership and Firm Patenting
荣昭，美国佛罗里达国际大学经济学博士，现任教于西南财经大学经济与管理研究院。研究方向包括：企业创新、公司金融、中国经济。近年来，在China Agricultural Economic Review、Journal of Accounting and Finance、China Economic Review、金融研究、经济 学季刊等SSCI期刊和中文核心期刊发表多篇学术论文，研究成果获得“2014年管理学年会最佳论文”等学术荣誉。
Managers may be concerned about their career, thus invest less than the optimal level in risky projects, such as innovation. The presence of institutional investors may alleviate their career concern, thereby enhancing firm innovation. By investigating China's high-tech listed firms during 2001-2007, we find that the presence of institutional investors did enhance firm patenting. Consistent with the career concern hypothesis, we find that the effect of institutional investors on firm patenting was stronger when the product market competition was more intense. We also find that managers were less likely to be fired in firms with higher institutional ownership when bad performance occurred. Moreover, the above findings only existed among non-SOEs but not among SOEs, in which top managers were also government officials.