【3月20日】【会计学院龙马奋进——学术论坛】Do Investors Turn a Blind Eye to Risk-Factor Disclosures by State-Controlled发布日期：2019-09-12 21:10:16
摘要：We examine investor responses to risk-factor disclosures in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) prospectuses in China, which is characterized as a state-controlled economy. In such an economy, state-controlled firms receive various preferential treatments from the government, resulting in lower operating and bankruptcy risks compared to non-state-controlled firms. Consistent with the theoretical conjecture that more risk-factor disclosures reduce cost of equity, our results indicate that, high-quality risk-factor disclosures are associated with less IPO underpricing and lower post-IPO stock return volatility among non-state-controlled IPO firms. However, we find an insignificant association between risk-factor disclosure quality and IPO underpricing (or post-IPO stock return volatility) among state-controlled firms. Our findings suggest that state-offered implicit insurance becomes the predominant consideration when investors value IPO shares of state-controlled firms, thereby weakening the investor demand for high-quality risk-factor disclosures. Our study highlights the importance of considering the state control effect, which renders the high-quality risk disclosures ineffective for state-controlled firms in economies with significant government involvement.
讲座人简介：陈峰，多伦多大学管理学院副教授。2008年毕业于哥伦比亚大学，获管理学博士学位。研究领域为审计、公司信息披露、公司治理、财务报告以及国际会计等。曾在Journal of Accounting Research，The Accounting Review，Contemporary Accounting Research，Review of Accounting Studies等期刊发表多篇学术成果。